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Quarantined Within a New Colonial Order: 
The 1876-1877 Lake Winnipeg Smallpox Epidemic
RYAN C. EYFORD
Abstract
This paper examines the link between the public health measures of quarantine 
and sanitation and the creation of racially-segregated reserves in the Canadian 
Northwest. In the fall of 1876, a smallpox epidemic broke out among Icelandic 
settlers and Aboriginal people living along the southwest coast of Lake 
Winnipeg. In response government officials formed a Board of Health and took 
measures to prevent the spread of the disease. The affected district was placed 
under a rigid quarantine and health officers were sent out to treat the victims 
and vaccinate people in adjacent communities. Due to both these measures 
and the diligence of local people, the disease was effectively contained and the 
number of dead, while significant, did not reach the levels of previous smallpox 
epidemics. However, the public health response to the crisis had far reaching 
consequences. By extending and legitimating the authority of the Canadian state 
over a region where its influence was previously quite limited, quarantine and 
sanitation helped reify a new colonial order mandating the compartmentaliza-
tion of land and people into a system of Indian and immigrant reservations. 
Résumé
Cet article étudie le lien entre les mesures de santé publique et d’hygiène 
prises lors de la quarantaine et la création de réserves fondée sur la ségréga-
tion raciale dans le Nord-Ouest canadien. À l’automne 1876, une épidémie 
de variole se propage parmi les pionniers islandais et les Autochtones vivant 
le long de la côte sud-ouest du lac Winnipeg. Pour faire face à la situation, 
le gouvernement met en place un service d’hygiène afin de contrer la propa-
gation de la maladie. Le district touché est mis en quarantaine sévère et des 
agents de santé sont dépêchés sur les lieux pour traiter les victimes et pour 
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vacciner les habitants des communautés voisines. Grâce aux mesures prises 
et à l’empressement des résidents, la maladie est vite maîtrisée et le nombre 
de décès, quoiqu’important, n’atteint pas celui des épidémies de variole anté-
rieures. Cependant, la réaction des autorités publiques à cette crise entraîne de 
profondes conséquences. La quarantaine et l’hygiène accentuent et légitiment 
l’autorité de l’État canadien dans une région où son influence était très limitée, 
ce qui contribue à faire régner un nouvel ordre colonial avec comme mandat 
la compartimentation des terres et des habitants en un système de réserves 
d’Autochtones et d’immigrants. 
On 24 September 1876, the Reverend James Settee conducted Sunday services at Sandy Bar, a native village on the southwest coast of Lake 
Winnipeg, in what is now the Interlake region of Manitoba. In his capacity 
as a Church of England missionary, Settee was a regular visitor to the native 
settlements around the lake and counted several converts among the Sandy Bar 
band. However, that day the congregation also included a group of Icelandic 
immigrants who had recently settled in and around the native village. Settee 
said prayers in Cree, Ojibwa, and English, and one of the colonists provided 
Icelandic translation. Settee’s sermon was drawn from the first Epistle of John, 
a passage emphasizing God’s infinite love, and the duty of God’s children to 
love one another.1 The missionary probably chose this particular passage as 
part of an effort to diffuse tensions between the natives and the settlers; the 
arrival of the Icelanders earlier that summer had triggered a tense confrontation 
over land that almost became violent.2 Still, their joint attendance at Reverend 
Settee’s service suggests that the two groups had a complex relationship; fear, 
suspicion, and resentment did not preclude cooperation and friendly interac-
tion in specific circumstances. However, in this context, as in many others, the 
mixing of indigenous and settler populations had fatal consequences. Smallpox 
broke out in the fall 1876 and within two months had decimated the Sandy Bar 
band. A doctor sent by the Canadian government reported that their numbers 
had been reduced from fifty or sixty to only seventeen. He found the scarred 
survivors huddled in tents surrounded by newly dug graves.3 The band’s homes 
 1 Church Missionary Society (hereafter CMS), C C 1 O 57, reel 55, “Extract from the journal 
of Rev. James Settee, 8 September 1876 to 15 May 1877”; 1 John 4:16, “God is love; and he 
that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him.”
 2 Friðrik Sveinsson, “Endurminningar frá Landnámstímanum,” in Thorleifur Jóakimsson, ed., 
Brot af Landnámssögu Nýja Íslands (Winnipeg, MB: Columbia Press, 1919), 33.
 3 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development fonds, RG 10, Black Series, vol. 3638, file 7213, Reel C-10112, “Clandeboye 
Agency – Correspondence Regarding an Outbreak of Smallpox among the Indians of Lake 
Winnipeg and the Subsequent Vaccination campaign”; Dr. J.S. Lynch to J.A.N. Provencher, 
11 April 1877.
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and possessions were ordered burned to prevent further infection, and shortly 
thereafter Dominion Land Surveyors arrived to plant posts marking the bound-
aries of the proposed Icelandic town of Sandvík (Sand Cove).4
This paper examines the role of the 1876-1877 smallpox epidemic in estab-
lishing a new settler-oriented colonial order in the Interlake region of Manitoba. 
At first glance, this case seems to confirm general understandings about the rela-
tionship between disease and colonialism: the arrival of a group of Europeans 
on a colonial frontier precipitated an epidemic that devastated the native popula-
tion and cleared the way for the appropriation of their land and resources. This 
generalized story, at best, serves only to highlight the tragic outcome of a com-
plex set of events. At worst, it obscures that complexity by casting Aboriginal 
demographic decline as a primarily biologically driven process. What happened 
at Lake Winnipeg in 1876-1877 was not inevitable; it was the product of a his-
torically contingent set of circumstances. Historical geographers of medicine 
Jody Decker and Paul Hackett have demonstrated that the impact of disease on 
Aboriginal populations in Northwest North America varied greatly over time, 
and changed with shifting patterns of trade, migration, and settlement.5 From the 
onset of European contact, epidemics stimulated migrations, shifted balances of 
power, and altered boundaries between peoples.6
The 1876-1877 smallpox epidemic demonstrates how Aboriginal disposses-
sion and settler-colonialism were linked through the overlapping governmental 
apparatuses of territoriality and public health. The measures taken in response 
to the epidemic allowed the Canadian state to exercise new forms of power over 
spaces and people where its influence had previously been quite limited. This 
occurred both through coercive means and — perhaps more significantly in a 
context where the state’s presence was relatively light — the self-regulation 
of individuals and groups acting in their perceived best interests. Ultimately, 
however, quarantine and sanitation measures helped to reify a new spatial 
order mandating the compartmentalization of land and people into a system of 
racially-segregated reserves that was integral to the Canadian colonization of 
the Northwest during the late nineteenth century.
In October 1875, the Canadian government reserved a tract of land in the 
Northwest Territories for the exclusive use of Icelandic migrants. This reserve 
extended forty-two miles north from the 1870 border of the Province of 
 4 Archives of Manitoba (hereafter AM), Department of Mines and Natural Resources fonds, GR 
1601, Land Surveyors’ Field Books, vol. 664, “George McPhillips, Survey of the Villages of 
Sandy Bar and Riverton, 23 September-6 October 1876.”
 5 Jody F. Decker, “Depopulation of the Northern Plains Natives,” Social Science and Medicine
33, no. 4 (1991): 381-93; Paul Hackett, “A Very Remarkable Sickness”: Epidemics in the Petit 
Nord, 1670-1846 (Winnipeg, MB: University of Manitoba Press, 2002), 237-38.
 6 Hackett, “A Very Remarkable Sickness,” 242.
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Manitoba along the southwest coast of Lake Winnipeg and included Big Island 
and several smaller islands nearby.7 The first group of approximately 200 
Icelandic colonists arrived in late October 1875, and 1,200 more joined them 
the following summer. These two groups were composed primarily of families 
with young children; most single people and older children stayed behind in 
Winnipeg to work as domestic servants or general labourers. Initially, the set-
tlers concentrated around their new village of Gimli in the southern portion 
of the colony, but by October 1876 they had occupied much of the reserve, 
which they called Ny´ja Ísland (New Iceland).8 The migration and settlement 
of the Icelanders in this colony were given substantial financial support by the 
Dominion government. Officials in Ottawa hoped that the Icelanders would 
facilitate the northward expansion of European agricultural settlement from 
its base in the Red River valley into the region between lakes Winnipeg and 
Manitoba.
The Icelandic reserve’s legal status as a homogeneous ethnic colony did 
not mean that the colonists were isolated from the other inhabitants of the 
region. From the time of their arrival, the Icelanders were engaged in a web of 
economic, social, and cultural interactions with the local indigenous popula-
tion, the established settler community, and Canadian government officials. 
Lake Winnipeg had long been a vital transportation corridor linking the Red 
River settlement in the south with the fur-trading centres of the north. By the 
early 1870s it was being regularly traveled by Anglo-Canadian explorers, 
journalists, and government officials. In addition, a handful of settlers were 
attracted by the region’s fish, timber, and mineral resources.9 The lands around 
the lake were home to a substantial Ojibwa, Cree, and mixed-blood population 
including the area that became the Icelandic reserve.10 These people continued 
to occupy their homes, even as treaty negotiators, surveyors, and the immi-
grants themselves disregarded their claims and sought to impose a new order. 
In short, the Icelandic reserve was a dynamic contact zone in which frequent 
and sustained interaction across ethno-cultural boundaries was the norm, 
 7 LAC, Department of Agriculture fonds, RG 17, General Correspondence, vol. 143, docket 
14915, “Order in Council – Icelanders’ Reserve,” 8 October 1875.
 8 For a general overview of Icelandic migration to Canada and the development of the Icelandic-
Canadian ethnic community, see Anne Brydon, “Icelanders,” in Encyclopedia of Canada’s 
Peoples, Paul Robert Magocsi, ed. (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario and 
University of Toronto Press, 1999), 685-700.
 9 See Frank Tough, ‘As Their Natural Resources Fail’: Native Peoples and the Economic 
History of Northern Manitoba, 1870-1930 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1996).
 10 See Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the 
North-West Territories, Including the Negotiations on Which They Were Based, and Other 
Information Relating Thereto (Toronto: Belfords Clarke & Co., 1880), 155-7.
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and was fundamentally shaped by the asymmetrical power relations of colo-
nialism.11
Strangely, a contact perspective emphasizing co-presence and interaction 
has been largely absent from the historical writing about New Iceland. Instead, 
it is the notion of the colony’s separateness and isolation that has shaped his-
torians’ interpretations. Recent monographs by the Icelandic writers Guðjón 
Arngrímsson and Jónas Thor construct New Iceland as a terra nullius where the 
immigrants attempted to replicate their old-world networks of kin and commu-
nity and fulfill previously frustrated national aspirations.12 Their brief mentions 
of Aboriginal people simply repeat well-worn racial and cultural stereotypes 
about native passivity in the face of white encroachment that have long ago 
been exposed as convenient fictions of colonialism.13 One important exception 
is anthropologist Anne Brydon’s analysis of Icelandic-Canadian mythic narra-
tives about contact with Aboriginal people. Brydon reveals how stories stressing 
cooperation, friendly interaction, and mutual respect have obscured a more con-
tentious history involving protracted disputes over land and bitterness over the 
tragedy of the smallpox epidemic. She argues that this refashioning of history is 
part of an Icelandic-Canadian narrative strategy to diminish the painful legacy 
of colonialism.14 While this article also recognizes and explores the role of the 
Icelanders as colonizers, its primary concern is with identifying how both they 
and the Aboriginal people they displaced were caught up in the same project 
of colonial governance. It therefore seeks to draw connections between immi-
gration and colonization, two topics frequently treated as historiographically 
distinct. As Adele Perry has pointed out, dispossession of Aboriginal people and 
the building of an orderly settler population is a relational process.15
The discourses of race, progress, and civilization, typically used to legiti-
mate rule over indigenous people could also mark other Europeans as racially 
 11 My use of the term “contact zone” follows Mary Louise Pratt’s definition of it as a place 
where “peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other 
and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequal-
ity, and intractable conflict.” See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
Transculturation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 6.
 12 Guðjón Arngrímsson, Nýja Ísland: Saga of the Journey to New Iceland, Robert Christie, trans. 
(Winnipeg, MB: Turnstone Press, 2000); Jonas Thor, Icelanders in North America: the First 
Settlers (Winnipeg, MB: University of Manitoba Press, 2002). 
 13 In describing the native inhabitants of the Icelandic reserve, Arngrímsson, states, “The 
Salteaux [sic] were a peaceful people, who offered little resistance when the white man came 
and took their land. Like the animals they hunted, they were a semi-nomadic people, seldom 
settling for long in one place ….” Arngrímsson, Nýja Ísland, 194. Also see Thor, Icelanders in 
North America, 102-3.
 14 Anne Brydon, “Dreams and Claims: Icelandic-Aboriginal Interactions in the Manitoba 
Interlake,” Journal of Canadian Studies 36, no. 2 (2001): 164-90.
 15 Adele Perry, On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 
1849-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 19.
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and culturally degenerate.16 The 1876-1877 smallpox epidemic exposed the 
ambiguous position of the Icelandic immigrants in the emerging colonial order 
of the Canadian Northwest. While they were unquestionably the agents of 
European colonization at the local level, actively displacing the indigenous 
population with the backing of the Canadian state, as impoverished, non-
English speaking immigrants, unfamiliar with local conditions and dependent 
on government rations for survival, they were also clearly subordinate within 
the wider settler-society. Their susceptibility to smallpox was interpreted by 
some Anglo-Canadians as a function of their inherent racial characteristics 
as well as their specific material circumstances. In a report commissioned by 
Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and Keewatin Alexander Morris, Dr. James 
Spencer Lynch provided a detailed description of the Icelanders’ colony, and 
an evaluation of their future prospects as settlers and as citizens of Canada. Dr. 
Lynch’s experience as medical officer at Gimli during the epidemic led him to a 
mainly negative evaluation: “Centuries of isolation and intermarriage have had 
the effect of reducing their physical condition to a point below which they are 
likely to be successful in the rude contest with western pioneers.” According to 
Dr. Lynch, the principle way for the Icelanders to survive and thrive in their new 
home was to assimilate with more vigorous peoples. Apart from exogamy, Dr. 
Lynch prescribed modifications in diet, hygiene, and housing that he believed 
would ameliorate the worst defects of the Icelandic character.17 The essential 
problem that Lynch addressed was the Icelanders’ ability to participate suc-
cessfully in western colonization. The smallpox epidemic had brought this into 
question, and, as a physician, Lynch was called upon to translate his knowledge 
of medicine and health into recommendations that would serve the prerogatives 
of state policy. In his view, the improvement of the Icelanders’ health and their 
ultimate success as colonists was inextricably linked to their adoption of new 
modes of behaviour and even integration with Anglo-Canadian settlers.
This example illustrates Michel Foucault’s insights on the importance of 
public health and medicine as instruments of governmental power.18 The lit-
erature on public health in colonial contexts that has followed from Foucault’s 
work has demonstrated how medicine functioned not simply as a means 
of relieving human suffering, but also as a key instrument of governance. 
Public health was part of the matrix of governing power that rendered subject 
populations knowable in the statistical languages of state bureaucratic admin-
 16 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 10.
 17 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG 6, General Correspondence, vol. 28, 
docket 536, Alexander Morris to R.W. Scott, 21 April 1877.
 18 Michel Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” in Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, Colin Gordon, ed. 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 176.
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istration.19 As Nayan Shah has noted in the context of nineteenth century San 
Francisco, public health was one of the most powerful mechanisms used by 
the civic government to regulate the property and conduct of the city’s immi-
grant population.20 During the late nineteenth century, migrants were subject 
to coercive public health measures such as quarantine, forced hospital confine-
ment, and destruction of personal property to a far greater degree than more 
established sections of society.21 In the Canadian context, Maureen Lux and 
Mary Ellen Kelm have demonstrated how Aboriginal people were subject to 
even more intense and sustained regimes of public health and sanitation that 
reinforced ideas about Aboriginal inferiority and served as a powerful justi-
fication for the policy of assimilation.22 By placing migrant and indigenous 
experience with colonial medicine in the same frame, we can analyze their 
mutual constitution as colonial subjects through what Nicholas Thomas calls 
the project of sanitizing-colonizing, in which there was “a constant slippage 
… between interests in reducing mortality and other agendas; political, moral, 
and cultural impositions were justified by their association and conflation with 
the programme of sanitation.”23
In the case of the 1876 smallpox epidemic in the Icelandic reserve, the 
other agenda at work was the creation of a new system of racial reserves that 
distinguished white from Aboriginal space, and new immigrants from the older 
settled community. Australian historian of medicine Alison Bashford has noted 
how both race and public health were segregative discourses, as “spatial segre-
gation on public health grounds often dovetailed with already existing spatial 
management of people through racial rationales: indigenous people in various 
systems of reserves and mission stations.”24 In the Icelandic reserve, the spatial 
management of people had, prior to the epidemic, been implemented only par-
tially and unevenly. It was the disruption created by the emergency that allowed 
the new order to be translated into a more concrete form.
 19 Alison Bashford, “Medicine, Gender, and Empire,” in Philippa Levine, ed., Gender and 
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 112-3.
 20 Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisc’s Chinatown
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 3. 
 21 Esyllt W. Jones, “‘Co-Operation in All Human Endeavour’: Quarantine and Immigrant 
Disease Vectors in the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic in Winnipeg,” Canadian Bulletin of 
Medical History 22, no. 1 (2005): 58.
 22 See Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 
1900-50 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1998); Maureen K. Lux, Medicine
That Walks: Disease, Medicine and Canadian Plains Native People, 1880-1940 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001).
 23 Nicholas Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 116. 
 24 Alison Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and 
Public Health (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 130. 
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Territoriality
The concept of territoriality is useful in analyzing the spatial management of 
the land and people in a colonial state. Territoriality implies the strategies and 
devices through which people construct and maintain spatial organization with 
the goal of directing and controlling the behavior of the resident population. 
It involves three basic human behaviours: “a form of classification by area, a 
form of communication by boundary, and an attempt at enforcing.”25 A sys-
tematic survey dividing the land into a geometrical grid in which the basic unit 
was a one mile square section, was the chosen device of territoriality employed 
by the Canadian government in the Northwest.26 Under the 1872 Dominion 
Lands Act, settlers could obtain a quarter section in exchange for a fee of ten 
dollars and after fulfilling a residence requirement of three years.27 Throughout 
the entire period of the smallpox epidemic there were two teams of surveyors 
traveling through the Icelandic reserve, marking out the sections, quarter-sec-
tions, and town sites with iron stakes. A third surveying and construction crew 
worked on a colonization road connecting the three proposed Icelandic town 
sites of Gimli, Sandvík, and Icelander’s River.28
During the 1870s, three key terms were used for communities that sur-
veyors traversed: settlement, reserve, and colony. These terms were often used 
interchangeably; however, each had more specific meanings that illuminate 
some of the transformations taking place in the Canadian Northwest during this 
period. Settlement described both a particular place and a process: the taking 
possession of a space often constructed as empty or inadequately utilized. It is 
therefore associated, quite correctly, with the ideas and practices of acquisitive 
European settler colonialism.29 Yet during the mid- to late nineteenth century 
settlement was also used to describe communities of native people who had 
adopted some modes of living traditionally associated with Europeans, such 
as living in permanent houses and cultivating plots of land. Examples of such 
places include the Swampy Cree and Ojibwa villages that developed near 
 25 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 16-17.
 26 On the use of the survey as an instrument of governmental power, see Rod Bantjes, Improved 
Earth: Prairie Space as Modern Artefact, 1869-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2005). For a comparative international perspective on the same issues, see Kate Brown, 
“Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana Are Nearly the Same Place,” American
Historical Review 106, no. 1 (2001): 17-48.
 27 Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1987), 182-3.
 28 AM, Department of Mines and Natural Resources fonds, GR 1601, Land Surveyors’ Field 
Notebooks, Notebooks 651-654 and 674-678.
 29 R. Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British 
Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002), 47. 
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Christian missions and Hudson’s Bay Company posts around Lake Winnipeg 
during the mid-nineteenth century. Many of these places, such as Norway 
House and Fort Alexander, ultimately became Indian reserves.30
Today, the term reserve is of course most commonly associated with 
Aboriginal people, particularly with their dispossession and marginalization. 
The extinguishing of Aboriginal title by treaty and the creation of Indian 
reserves was an integral part of the nascent Canadian state’s efforts to assert 
control over its newly acquired lands in the early 1870s. However, the language 
of reserve was also used to describe land grants made to a wide variety of 
corporate entities and social groupings. Reserve, essentially denoted the legal 
relationship of these groups to the land distribution policies of the state. As a 
means of encouraging immigration to Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, 
reserves were set aside for the exclusive use of particular ethno-cultural or 
religious communities after — and sometimes before — the extinguishment 
of Aboriginal title. The Icelandic reserve on the southwest shore of Lake 
Winnipeg in 1875 was the first such experiment launched by the Canadian 
government in the Northwest Territories. Its creation followed the successful 
example set by Mennonites from Russia and French-Canadians from New 
England in Manitoba the previous year.31
These settlement reserves were also sometimes referred to as colonies.
This term was used to emphasize their status as a collective arrangement based 
on shared ethnic, religious, or ideological characteristics.32 In the case of subor-
dinate ethno-cultural groups, colony could also be used to indicate — in a more 
precise way than settlement or reserve — their dual status as the local agents 
of empire and the subjects of its civilizing mission.33 These groups of course 
had their own names for their communities and often renamed local physical 
features to underline their possession of the land. Hence, the Icelandic colo-
nists renamed the White Mud River Íslendingafljót (Icelander’s River). They 
called each of the districts within New Iceland byggð or settlements. Immigrant 
Friðrik Sveinsson also used the later term to describe the native settlement at 
Sandy Bar and White Mud River, which occupied the same territory as the 
developing Icelandic fljótsbyggð (river settlement).34
According to the missionary James Settee, a permanent Ojibwa village at 
Sandy Bar was created in the autumn of 1871. He told the Church Missionary 
 30 Tough, ‘As Their Natural Resources Fail’, 143-4.
 31 Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 186.
 32 See A.W. Rasporich, “Utopian Ideals and Community Settlements in Western Canada, 1880-
1914,” in R. D. Francis and Howard Palmer, eds., The Prairie West: Historical Readings, 2nd 
ed., rev. and exp. (Edmonton, AB: Pica Pica Press, 1992), 352-77.
 33 See, for example, the reports of Lord Dufferin’s visit to the Icelandic reserve in 1877 in 
Manitoba Daily Free Press (17 September 1877).
 34 Sveinsson, “Endurminningar frá Landnámstímanum,” 33.
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Society that “some of the Indians who are still wandering about had agreed 
amongst themselves … that they wanted to take the example of the Whites and 
follow a civilized life.” Settee stated that many had been born in the region and 
considered it their home. They chose the site for permanent settlement because 
its abundant fisheries and game offered many advantages for “new settlers.”35
When Settee visited the village in 1875 he found a total of twenty-four families 
and a few widows residing there. He expected that the village would soon be a 
large one, and reported that a school house was under construction, and that the 
people had requested a teacher be provided for them.36 By this time, the popu-
lation may have included a group of Swampy Cree from Norway House who 
had also selected the site for an agricultural colony. They wrote to Lieutenant 
Governor Morris and requested that the region be designated an Indian reserve. 
This proposal was looked upon favourably until the prospect of an Icelandic 
reserve in the same location appeared in the summer of 1875.37 The delegation 
of Icelanders that chose the site as the heart of their proposed colony stated 
that the Indians living at Sandy Bar were “Christianized and civilized” and not 
to be feared. Based on the assurances received from Morris, they confidently 
asserted that “as soon as the Icelanders begin to settle here, these few Indians 
will be located elsewhere.”38
This location did not happen as expected. The Sandy Bar band, and 
a related band on Big Island, continued to live in the region long after the 
Icelanders arrived. In spite of aggressive behaviour on the part of the settlers, 
including the occupation of native-built log cabins, it was only the death of the 
majority of the band members during the smallpox epidemic and the destruc-
tion of their homes by public health officials that muted their resistance to 
Icelandic encroachment.39 Both bands attempted to assert their claim to the 
region at negotiations with treaty officials in the summer of 1876. The land in 
question was technically included in Treaty 2 (1871), although neither band 
had taken part in those negotiations. Kat-te-pe-nais, Chief of the Big Island 
band, wrote to the Minister of the Interior insisting that his band be included in 
a treaty, and plans were made for a meeting at Dog Head in late July 1876 to 
bring his and several bands under the provisions of Treaty 5 (1875).
 35 CMS, C C 1 O 57, reel 55, Settee to CMS, 9 December 1872.
 36 Ibid., Settee Annual Report, 23 November 1875.
 37 LAC, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development fonds, RG 10, Black Series, 
vol. 3636, file 6743, reel C-10111, “Norway House Agency. Correspondence regarding the 
removal of Indians from Norway House to Grassy Narrows.”
 38 LAC, Department of Agriculture fonds, RG 17, General Correspondence, vol. 140, docket 
14663, John Taylor to the Minister of Agriculture, 31 August 1875. On Morris’s assurance to 
Taylor that the Sandy Bar band would be moved, see Ibid., vol., 166, docket 17253, Taylor to 
John Lowe, 20 August 1876.
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The ensuing treaty settlement was a profound disappointment for the Big 
Island and Sandy Bar bands. The treaty commissioners, through a combina-
tion of open threats and gentle persuasion, forced a uniform template of Indian 
administration onto several resistant groups that held different ideas about 
their formal relationship with the government. First, the treaty commissioners 
demanded that the five Island bands — Big Island, Blood Vein, Jack Fish, Dog 
Head, and Sandy Bar — elect a single chief and four councillors. The bands 
protested, saying that they were distinct from each other and did not wish to 
unite. Kat-te-pe-nais was especially vocal in his opposition to the plan; he 
claimed that if he signed under the conditions outlined by the commissioners, 
it would create a schism in his band. Commissioners Thomas Howard and J. 
Lestock Reid told him to sign or go home with nothing. Ultimately, Ka-te-pe-
nais acceded to their demands and signed, resulting in forty members of his 
hundred-member band renouncing his leadership and the treaty.40 Part of the 
reason for the split was Ka-te-pe-nais’s failure to secure Big Island as a reserve; 
the band was directed to remove to the Bad Throat River on the east side of 
the lake, which some of them apparently did.41 The treaty was even more of a 
disappointment for the Sandy Bar band. The commissioners denied that they 
were a distinct band, arguing that they should properly be considered part of 
the St. Peter’s (Peguis) band. The Sandy Bar band attempted to have the White 
Mud River set aside as a reserve, but were rebuffed by the commissioners. In 
the end, only twenty-seven of the approximately sixty band members signed 
the treaty.42 The Big Island and Sandy Bar bands were the only island bands to 
be denied their chosen reserve sites; all of the small reserve sites suggested by 
the other bands were accepted. It is clear that the reason for this decision was 
the fact that the land in question had been granted to the Icelanders. However, 
in defiance of the treaty settlement, even among those who signed, many mem-
bers of the Sandy Bar and Big Island bands returned to their homes for the 
remainder of the summer of 1876. By this time the Icelanders were beginning 
to move north from their settlement at Gimli to claim homesteads at White 
Mud River, Sandy Bar, and on Big Island. In September 1876, John Taylor, 
the Canadian government’s Icelandic agent at Gimli, reported that the Indians 
living in the Icelandic reserve had refused to leave the area, and predicted that 
their continued presence would be a source of problems.43
65
QUARANTINED WITHIN A NEW COLONIAL ORDER: 
THE 1876-1877 LAKE WINNIPEG SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC
 40 Manitoba Daily Free Press (23 September 1876).
 41 On 21 March 1877, Health Officer William Drever found the body of the Old Chief and 
three others at the Bad Throat River. See AM, Alexander Morris fonds, MG12 B1, Lieutenant 
Governor’s Collection, Correspondence, no. 1517, Drever to Morris, 3 August 1877.
 42 The correspondent for the Free Press gave the band’s total number, including women and 
children, as 40. See Manitoba Daily Free Press (23 September 1876).
 43 LAC, Department of Agriculture fonds, RG 17, General Correspondence, vol. 166, docket 
17253, Taylor to John Lowe, 20 August 1876.
The Icelanders’ northward migration resulted in a dispute between the two 
groups that almost turned violent. The only record of this encounter is Friðrik 
Sveinsson’s 1919 reminiscence ‘Fyrsta viðkynning við Rauðskinna’ (First 
Acquaintance with the Red-skins). Sveinsson, who was ten years old at the time, 
was among a group of three families who were the first Icelanders to settle at 
White Mud River in the summer of 1876. According to his account, there were 
a few fjölskyldur villimanna (families of savages) living in tents by the river 
when they arrived. Friðrik’s stepfather, Ólafur Ólafsson, became embroiled in 
a dispute with John Ramsay, one of the principal men of the Sandy Bar band. 
When Ramsay attempted to stop Ólafur from building on a piece of land that 
he claimed, the Icelander threatened him with an axe. Ramsay retreated, but 
returned several days later supported by several armed men and a translator. 
He told the Icelanders that they were building illegally because the north side 
of the river was not part of the Icelandic reserve. Ólafur agreed to consult with 
the authorities, which satisfied Ramsay. After Ólafur’s right to build on the land 
had been confirmed by a Dominion Indian agent, he and Ramsay worked out an 
agreement whereby Ramsay could continue to cultivate a garden and camp on 
Ólafur’s homestead.44 Once smallpox broke out, friendly exchanges between 
the two groups appear to have come to an end. Ramsay later reported to Dr. 
James Spencer Lynch that the Icelanders had refused to offer assistance to his 
people when they became ill, and even demanded payment for helping to bury 
the dead.45 In forwarding the report to Ottawa, Acting Indian Superintendent 
J.A.N. Provencher stated that he had previously received similar reports of the 
Icelanders’ behaviour.46
The Epidemic
It was in this fractious contact zone in the northern part of the Icelandic 
reserve where the smallpox epidemic began. It appears to have been part of 
a world-wide outbreak of smallpox in 1876 that was reported in major ports 
such as Liverpool, Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, and San Francisco.47 The group 
of Icelanders who arrived in the colony in late summer 1876 had recently 
passed through several of the Atlantic ports where the disease was prevalent. 
According to the journal of immigrant Þorgrímur Jónsson, smallpox was car-
ried to the colony in some clothing purchased in Quebec City by a man named 
 44 Sveinsson, “Endurminningar frá Landnámstímanum,” 31-7.
 45 LAC, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development fonds, RG 10, Black Series, 
vol. 3638, file 7213, Reel C-10112, “Clandeboye Agency – Correspondence Regarding an 
Outbreak of Smallpox among the Indians of Lake Winnipeg and the Subsequent Vaccination 
campaign”; Lynch to Provencher, 11 April 1877; Provencher to Mills, 16 April, 1877.
 46 Ibid.
 47 See Manitoba Daily Free Press (4 January 1877).
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Jón Jónsson.48 Þorgrímur, Jón and their families were part of a small group 
that sailed north from Gimli to claim land along the White Mud River in early 
September 1876. Jón had been too weak to help with the rowing during the 
journey and shortly after their arrival he broke out with a fever. It is likely that 
he was among the group that occupied the house of Elizabeth Fidler, a mixed-
race woman who lived with the Sandy Bar band.49 In the cramped quarters of 
the 23x14 foot cabin the disease soon spread to other members of the group, 
including Þorgrímur’s family. On 5 October, his two-year old son became the 
first Icelandic victim of the disease.50 Fidler’s house became known among the 
Icelanders as Bóla (pox) because of its association with the beginning of the 
epidemic.51
While the immigrants believed that the sickness was related to their recent 
migration experience, there was confusion and disagreement over what disease 
it was. John Taylor, the resident government agent responsible for administering 
the Icelandic reserve, stated that the “Icelandic doctors” — referring to several 
individuals who possessed various kinds of formal and informal medical train-
ing — were convinced that the disease was not smallpox. Taylor reassured his 
superiors in Ottawa that there was no need for alarm, and proposed vaccinating 
the settlers as a precaution.52 While Taylor was able to procure some vaccine, 
it ultimately proved to be ineffective and the disease spread through the colony 
unchecked. When three Icelanders and seven Indians died at White Mud River 
in early November, Sigtryggur Jónasson, the assistant government agent, 
requested that Taylor immediately send for medical help: “I think it is neces-
sary to have a skilled physician from Manitoba to come down here to examine 
some of the patients, provide medicine and prescribe the proper treatment of 
the disease, of which the Icelanders, if it be the small-pox, are totally ignorant, 
that disease not being prevalent in Iceland.”53
In 1876, neither the Icelanders nor their Aboriginal neighbours had much 
first-hand knowledge of the physical effects of the smallpox virus. However, the 
devastating results of past epidemics were preserved in their oral and written 
historical traditions. When recording the epidemic in their respective journals 
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Þorgrímur Jónsson and James Settee both made reference to previous epidem-
ics that had afflicted their people.54 Over the long term, these two groups had 
remarkably similar histories with the disease. Both had been affected by disas-
trous smallpox epidemics in the eighteenth century. In 1707-1709, the disease 
killed twenty-six percent of Iceland’s population.55 Iceland was affected by 
the world-wide epidemic of the early 1780s, which also devastated a village of 
Cree, Assiniboine, and Ojibwa at the mouth of the Red River around 1780.56
The effects of smallpox were mitigated after 1800 with the introduction of vac-
cination as a preventative measure. In the late 1830s, there were vaccination 
campaigns in Northwest North America by the Hudson’s Bay Company and in 
Iceland by Danish colonial authorities that helped stop another epidemic in its 
tracks.57 But by 1876, neither the Icelanders nor the natives had been subject to 
a comprehensive vaccination campaign, and therefore the generations born since 
1840 were susceptible to smallpox. In his 1877 report on the epidemic, Jónasson 
blamed the authorities in Iceland for becoming lax in their duty to vaccinate 
every person in the country. He asserted that those settlers who had been prop-
erly vaccinated in the past five to seven years did not contract the disease.58
By the time John Taylor wrote to Dr. David Young at Lower Fort Garry 
requesting medical help, rumours of smallpox among the Icelanders and Indians 
at Sandy Bar had been circulating at Red River for some time. News had been 
carried to St. Peter’s by friends of the Sandy Bar band, and from there conveyed 
to Winnipeg. Local government officials began to take these rumours seriously 
only after the Manitoba Daily Free Press published a letter from one of the sur-
veyors at work at Sandy Bar on 15 November. Based on this report the paper’s 
editor asserted, “there can be no doubt that it is the small-pox that is raging, and 
that too of a most virulent type.”59 J.A.N. Provencher, Acting Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs in Manitoba, sent Dr. James Spencer Lynch to the Icelandic colony 
to assist Dr. Young and to treat the Indians of the district. On 22 November, Drs. 
Young and Lynch reported from Gimli, “The disease here is smallpox of a mild 
variety varioloid but very fatal owing to unfavourable circumstances bad food, 
 54 Þorgrímur Jónsson in Brot af Landnámssögu Nýja Íslands, 32; CMS, C C 1 O 57, reel 55, 
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want of ventilation. About twenty persons had died in this immediate neighbour-
hood within the past ten days; it is reported that only two Indians are left living 
at Sandy Bar out of twenty.”60 With this official pronouncement, government 
officials began to formulate their response, but it was too late; the disease had 
already spread throughout the Icelandic colony and its immediate environs. By 
the time the epidemic had run its course, 103 Icelanders had died out of a popula-
tion of approximately 1,200. According to a list compiled by Sigtyggur Jónasson, 
the vast majority of the victims were children; only twenty-five persons out of 
the total dead were older than twelve years of age.61 No precise numbers, either 
of population or mortality, are available for the Aboriginal population. According 
to the Manitoba Free Press reporter who attended the Treaty 5 negotiations in 
July 1876, the Big Island band consisted of 100 persons and the Sandy Bar band 
of 57. In January 1877, Lt. Governor Morris stated that the number of ascertained 
deaths was 52, but based on information received from Dr. Lynch, he believed 
the number of Indian dead could be as high as 200.62
The disease was only identified as a problem of public health and gover-
nance when officially pronounced upon by two white physicians working as 
agents of the Canadian government. However, at least one person had correctly 
identified the disease two months earlier. On 25 September Sarah Settee, the 
mixed-blood wife of the missionary James Settee, told the Sandy Bar band 
that the disease afflicting the Icelanders was smallpox, and that they should 
leave Sandy Bar if they valued their lives. This advice was apparently ignored 
by all but one man who fled with his family, possibly spreading the disease 
to the other side of Lake Winnipeg. James Settee also disregarded his wife’s 
claims even though he acknowledged that she had first hand knowledge of 
the disease.63 Sarah’s medical knowledge was discounted because of her race 
and gender and lack of professional credentials. The same can be said for the 
Icelandic immigrant Rebekka Guðmundsdóttir, who had received training as a 
nurse and midwife in northern Iceland. Rebekka’s role in distributing helpful 
medicines to smallpox victims was noted in community histories, but her name 
does not appear on the list of Icelanders employed by the Keewatin Board of 
Health or in any of the official documentation.64
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Epidemics are not only the naturally occurring result of discrete biological 
processes, but also events produced by public health authorities reading a situ-
ation and taking particular courses of action. As the epidemic is pronounced 
upon and actions are taken to address it, new forms of knowledge about a 
population are generated and new modes of governance are created.65 The 
response to the 1876 smallpox epidemic was, literally, the creation of a new 
government that served both as a Board of Health and as a territorial author-
ity for Keewatin, the region north and east of the province of Manitoba and 
including the Icelandic reserve. This territory was created in October 1876, 
largely at the behest of Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris, to respond 
to the planned transfer of the government of the Northwest Territories from 
Winnipeg to a point further west. Morris argued that because of limited trans-
port and communication networks in the region, it would be utterly impossible 
to govern the areas north and east of Manitoba. The Keewatin Act stipulated 
that the region was to be governed by a council of five to ten men, headed 
by the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba. The Dominion government did not 
appoint this council until the emergency of the smallpox epidemic forced its 
hand.66 Morris recommended a council of six senior civil servants from vari-
ous departments and agencies of the Dominion and Manitoba governments. 
The constant slippage between the council’s role as a territorial government 
and as an instrument of public health enforcement was manifested in how it 
was alternately referred to in official documents as the Council of Keewatin 
and as the Keewatin Board of Health.67
The Board of Health directed a massive mobilization of state resources 
to stem the spread of the disease. In the first instance this effort was directed 
toward the containment and treatment of smallpox within the Icelandic reserve 
and adjacent locations. Dr. William Augustus Baldwin was sent to assist Drs. 
Young and Lynch in this task. Native guides and assistants transported the doc-
tors and relief supplies through the district, buried the dead and burned infected 
property. The doctors centralized the treatment of the sick at a hospital at Gimli 
and employed several young Icelanders as nurses, orderlies, and translators. 
Towards the end of the epidemic, an old Hudson’s Bay Company physician, Dr. 
Henry Beddome oversaw the disinfection of Icelanders’ property. 
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Public Health 9, no. 4 (1999): 306.
 66 The Council of Keewatin only ever functioned during the smallpox epidemic. It was never 
again re-constituted, leaving the Icelandic reserve under the direct authority of the Lieutenant 
Governor of Manitoba until 1881, when it was incorporated into the province. See Lewis H. 
Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-97,
2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 83-5.
 67 See Canada, Sessional Papers, 1878, no. 10, “Special Appendix A,” xxix-xxx.
70
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2006 REVUE DE LA SHC
The second part of the response was the attempt to contain the disease 
geographically. Doctors were sent out to vaccinate the residents of the adjacent 
native communities of St. Peter’s, Brokenhead, Fort Alexander, and Fairford. 
The Icelandic reserve was put under quarantine and a cordon sanitaire was 
established at Netley Creek, just inside the northern boundary of the province. 
This boundary line was enforced by a thirteen member military garrison, and 
was part of a larger quarantine station that also included a hospital. The Health 
Officers at the Netley Creek station regulated the passage of people and goods 
from north to south.68 Before being allowed to pass individuals were forced to 
remain at the quarantine station for a fixed period of time and to discard their 
clothes and other possessions, which were often destroyed. Those who were 
deemed infected were confined to hospital. This quarantine remained in place 
until late July 1877.69 The final goal of the Board of Health’s activities was to 
protect the northern fur trade in order to avert the institution of an American 
blockade. The Board sent Health Officers to Dog Head, Beren’s River, and 
Norway House to inspect and tag furs bound for the south.70
While the above summary accurately describes the activities of the Board 
of Health during the epidemic, it does not convey the often fractious and con-
tested process by which these measures were adopted and implemented. The 
official response was devised on an ad hoc basis through often acrimonious 
negotiations between Lieutenant Governor Morris and the cabinet in distant 
Ottawa that were frequently punctuated by fundamental disagreements over 
jurisdiction and practice and bickering over money.71 Yet the Keewatin Board 
of Health was able to carry out its policies in a way that not only contained the 
smallpox epidemic but also furthered the Canadian state’s goal of segregat-
ing native and settler space. Because the number of government officials on 
the ground remained limited, implementation of the Board’s directives was 
dependent on the compliance of local people, secured both through overtly 
coercive means and the self-regulation of individuals and groups acting in their 
perceived best interests.
Quarantine and Sanitation
Following from the work of Foucault, historians and sociologists of medicine 
have traced the process, beginning in the eighteenth century, by which brute 
force public health measures such as the cordon sanitaire were increasingly 
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abandoned in favour of measures aimed at regulating and promoting the health 
of populations in more subtle and generalized ways. By the 1870s, public health 
advocates increasingly saw attempts to impose blanket quarantines over larger 
geographical areas as an obsolete and ineffective practice. The regulation and 
regimentation of space, objects, and people according to regimes of hygiene 
was presented as a better alternative.72 A central aspect of this new public 
health was fostering internalized self-discipline, particularly the desire for good 
health among a subject population.73 Alison Bashford argues that in colonial 
contexts, the practice of public health encompassed both the exercise of coer-
cive, sovereign power and new disciplinary modes of governance.74 In settler 
societies such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, migrants and indigenous 
people continued to be subjected to rigidly enforced regimes of quarantine. By 
quarantine, Bashford means not only a specific public health practice, but also 
a wider network of cultural practices involving isolation, containment, and the 
policing of spaces. In the Lake Winnipeg region, the public health practices of 
quarantine and sanitation and the spatial practices of treaty, survey, and coloni-
zation reserves operated hand in hand as apparatuses of governmental power.75
The quarantine and sanitation measures used by the Keewatin Board of Health 
during the smallpox epidemic belong within Bashford’s model. It was the 
dynamic interaction between the state’s coercive force and disciplinary modes 
of governance that allowed the new colonial organization of space to take hold 
around Lake Winnipeg. 
The tension between coercion and self-discipline was evident in the 
debate over the use of a cordon sanitaire to prevent travel between Manitoba 
and the “infected district” of Lake Winnipeg. Lieutenant Governor Morris 
and Manitoba Premier R.A. Davis argued that a rigid quarantine, enforced by 
the military, was essential to prevent the spread of the disease throughout the 
Northwest, and the death of thousands of Indians. Dominion government offi-
cials, by contrast, believed that this measure was unnecessary. Prime Minister 
Alexander Mackenzie argued that responsibility for the maintenance of health 
rested with the individual. In an encrypted telegram to Morris, Mackenzie 
stated bluntly, “People themselves must avoid contagion decline expenditure 
for Quarantine.”76
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Ambivalence about the use of a quarantine also appeared in public discus-
sion. The editor of the Manitoba Free Press came out strongly in favour of the 
measure:
The Dominion has a grave responsibility. Let them keep watch and guard over 
their colonists in Keewatin. Let the Indians be confined to their reserves and 
vaccinated. Let the public give the authorities their moral support. What has 
already been accomplished at Gimli proves that the disease can, humanely 
speaking, be controlled. Let us all bear in mind that “an ounce of prevention 
is worth a pound of cure.”77
On the other side, The Manitoba Herald opined: “[T]he quarantine line is dis-
tinctly announced as being made of red tape.”78 A correspondent to the paper 
wrote: “Small Pox!! Bah! All we have to do is keep ourselves clean, live well, 
observing the laws by which God governs the world and allow science (medi-
cal men) to do the rest and none of us will die from that loathsome disease.”79
After the crisis was over a letter writer to the Free Press complained that the 
destruction of clothes and property at the Quarantine Station had been useless. 
The editor saw fit to rebut this claim, and congratulated the people of Manitoba 
for adopting and enforcing the quarantine regulations.80
The editor was correct in recognizing that the quarantine was successful 
only because local people chose to enforce it. The area which the quarantine 
covered was simply too large to have been effectively policed by the small 
number of soldiers and health officers employed by the Board of Health. 
Prominent among those who were recognized by Lieutenant Governor Morris 
for helping to stop the spread of the disease through their strict adherence to 
the rules were the Ojibwa bands at St. Peter’s (Peguis), Fort Alexander, and 
Brokenhead.81 In 1869-1870, these bands had been spared from an epidemic 
that killed more that 2,600 Blood, Peigan, Blackfoot, Cree, and Assiniboines 
on the Plains.82 They therefore recognized the danger posed by smallpox, cut 
off their communication with people who had been to the Icelandic settle-
ment, and voluntarily confined themselves to their reserves. Keeping the Lake 
Winnipeg Indians on their reserves was a policy goal of the Dominion govern-
ment that the emergency itself enabled. While this action served to protect the 
bands from smallpox, it nonetheless had negative effects on their health. Being 
confined to their reserve prevented them from venturing farther out when 
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their local resources failed, as happened with the fishery in the fall of 1876. 
The chief and councilors of the Fort Alexander reserve wrote to Lieutenant 
Governor Morris stating that they required provisions from the government in 
order to make it through the winter, and that the local Indian agents and Acting 
Indian Superintendent J.A.N. Provencher had turned a deaf ear to them.83
They also stated that Dr. Willoughby Clark, who was sent to vaccinate them, 
was doing nothing because he had run out of vaccine matter.84 Dr. Clark con-
firmed the Fort Alexander band’s account of poor health owing to causes other 
than smallpox: “I found a great deal of sickness at this place caused principally 
by want of proper food and clothing — scrofula and pulmonary complaints 
predominantly.” He recommended that assistance to the band be increased, 
although there is no evidence that his recommendation was acted upon.85
The Icelanders also conformed to the quarantine, though the longer the 
regime continued, the more their resentment grew. Increasingly, the quarantine 
came to be seen by the colonists as a key source of their continued poverty and 
ill health. It restricted the flow of supplies into the colony, and therefore con-
tributed to hunger and malnourishment. It also created a greater strain on what 
resources were available by preventing the able bodied from leaving the reserve 
to find work in Manitoba. At the end of the epidemic in April 1877, Dr. Henry 
Beddome reported that the colonists were suffering from scurvy and diarrhea.86
In early July John Taylor wrote to Ottawa complaining that the quarantine 
was maintained even though no fresh cases of smallpox had appeared for five 
months and the colony had been thoroughly disinfected. On 1 August, Minister 
of Agriculture C.A.P. Pelletier wrote to Morris saying that the quarantine 
should be removed at once as it was “extremely cruel and unnecessary.”87 The 
military garrison was finally recalled on 21 July, but no notice was sent to the 
colonists. According to Taylor, they discovered the fact by chance when a group 
of one hundred young Icelanders, both male and female, set out to force their 
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way through the quarantine barriers.88 In a later report Taylor made a scathing 
attack on the administration of the Keewatin Board of Health: “The oppressive 
quarantine, so unnecessarily prolonged, has done more serious injury to the 
colony than can be repaired easily …. No quarantine procedures of a like char-
acter would have been submitted to for half the time by Canadians.”89
The quarantine was only lifted when officials were certain that the Icelandic 
reserve and its residents had been completely sanitized. This was a protracted 
process that began with the arrival of the doctors in November 1876 and did 
not conclude until the following July. Dr. Lynch produced a series of letters and 
reports that provided the Keewatin Board of Health and the Dominion cabinet 
with information about the Icelanders racial characteristics and modes of living. 
Lynch believed that centuries of inbreeding had made them racially degenerate, 
but thought that they were ultimately redeemable through intermarriage with 
other more vigorous races.90 Lynch claimed that the Icelanders’ racial degen-
eracy was manifested in their indifference to material advancement and their 
habit of living in over-crowded, dirty, and poorly ventilated houses. Many of 
Lynch’s official statements were echoed in a private letter Dr. William Augustus 
Baldwin wrote to his sister in Toronto. Baldwin said that the Icelanders’ poor 
health was the result of their living “like pigs.” The letter conveys his general 
revulsion at conditions in the Icelandic colony, and includes specific references 
to the unsanitary behaviour of his patients:
In one house a woman asked me if I would have a cup of coffee. I said 
yes, as the day was cold, so while I was making up some medicine for 
a poor sick boy — What do you think I saw the woman do — She no 
doubt thought that the cup was not clean enough for me, so she licked 
the cup all around with hir [sic] tongue and then took a towel as balck 
[sic] as could be — without it being a bit of black coth [sic] and dryed 
with it, and then gave it to me to drink. A nice sight to see for a man 
who wanted a drink to warm him.91
When expressing his sympathy for the suffering of the Icelanders, Baldwin cast 
himself in the role of the man of science and reason attempting to bring order 
to a disordered set of people badly in need of reform.
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The Icelanders both accommodated and resisted the colonizing-sanitizing 
mission of the Canadian doctors. At least nineteen Icelanders worked as nurses, 
attendants, and translators in the Gimli hospital and others assisted the medical 
officers on their travels through the colony.92 Dr. Lynch complained that many 
smallpox patients refused to be moved from their homes to the hospital. It was 
only when attendants entered the homes and threatened to remove them by 
force that they complied.93 While the Icelanders employed these strategies to 
meet both the disease emergency and the demands of the government officials, 
Sigtryggur Jónasson attempted to present an alternate picture of his people’s 
character to officials in Ottawa. He portrayed his countrymen in ways that he 
knew would be appealing to officials interested in building an orderly settler 
population. “[They] have kept up a remarkably good spirit during this great 
calamity, which many who don’t know their general disposition nor understand 
their language call indifference.”94 In sharp contrast to Dr. Lynch, Jónasson saw 
the Icelanders as hard-working and deeply committed to progress. By the end of 
the epidemic, the leaders of the Icelandic colony self-consciously adopted some 
of the institutional mechanisms of public health as practiced in Canada. One of 
the first actions of the colony’s municipal council was to take measures to dis-
infect the entire colony with soap and boiling water.95 Each byggð (settlement) 
within the colony formed a Board of Health to coordinate these efforts.96
In Icelandic settlements, disinfection did not involve the wholesale 
destruction of bodies and property. This was not the case among the region’s 
Aboriginal communities where burning of bodies, houses, and possessions 
was practiced at Sandy Bar, Sandy River, Black River, Bad Throat River, and 
Punk Island. The survivors who witnessed this activity sometimes allowed it, 
at other times resisted fiercely. William Drever, one of the doctors’ assistants, 
traveled to Bad Throat River on the east side of the lake to burn or bury the 
bodies of several members of the Big Island band. He was permitted to bury 
the body of the chief, Kat-te-pe-nais, but when Drever attempted to burn two 
others he was chased away.97 John Ramsay, one of the few survivors of the 
Sandy Bar band, helped Dr. Baldwin and Magnús Stefánsson burn the Indian 
 92 LAC, Department of Agriculture fonds, RG 17, General Correspondence, vol. 179, docket 
18531, Taylor to Taché, 15 January 1877.
 93 AM, Alexander Morris fonds, MG 12 B1, Lieutenant Governor’s Collection, Correspondence, 
no. 1377, Lynch to Morris, 3 December 1876.
 94 LAC, Department of Agriculture fonds, RG 17, General Correspondence, vol. 179, docket 
18595, Jónasson to Lowe, 20 January 1877.
 95 Ibid., vol. 187 ,docket 19318, Jónasson to Taylor, 28 March 1877.
 96 AM, Alexander Morris papers, MG 12 B1, Lieutenant Governor’s Collection, Correspondence, 
no. 1458, Beddome to Morris, 13 April 1877.
 97 Ibid., no. 1517, Drever to Morris, 3 August 1877.
76
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2006 REVUE DE LA SHC
village of Sandy River on the east side of Lake Winnipeg.98 However, Ramsay 
deeply resented the burning of his own village at Sandy Bar, conducted on 
the orders of Dr. Lynch.99 With most of the band members dead, this act had 
the effect of erasing an important physical vestige of the Sandy Bar band’s 
presence in the Icelandic reserve. It cleared the way for the land to be settled 
according to the survey of the area that had been completed near the end of 
1876. Lynch apparently felt some remorse over this act and advised the gov-
ernment to compensate the surviving members of the band, although this does 
not appear to have been done. In June 1877 Ramsay traveled to Winnipeg 
to personally express his aggravation over this act to Lieutenant Governor 
Morris, but did not receive any guarantees. Morris suggested that Ramsay and 
the other survivors should leave the Icelandic reserve and settle at Fisher River 
to the north.100
Conclusion
In the summer of 1876, exactly how Ramsay’s people and the Icelanders would 
resolve their joint claim to the southwest coast of Lake Winnipeg remained an 
open question. The Sandy Bar and Big Island bands repeatedly protested the 
appropriation of their land, and refused to abandon their settlement even after 
their request to form an Indian reserve was denied. The smallpox epidemic 
resulted in their dispossession, and the appropriation of their land and resources 
by the Icelanders. This outcome was not only due to the disease’s devastating 
physical effects, but also to the public health measures implemented by the 
Keewatin Board of Health. The quarantine boundaries that the Board enforced, 
and which were observed by local people, mirrored the boundaries of land 
distribution that the Canadian state wished to impose on the region. The crisis 
gave a new reality to the system of racially-defined reserves, and the rigid sepa-
ration of native and settler populations. What had once been a dynamic zone 
of Icelandic-Aboriginal contact became a far more homogeneous Icelandic 
space.
At the same time, the epidemic also dealt a serious blow to the Icelanders 
and their settlement. For many families, who had hoped for a new beginning 
in North America, it was a terrible personal tragedy. Many settlers emerged 
from quarantine impoverished and disillusioned with the government’s han-
dling of the crisis. This disillusionment was an important contributing factor 
to the out-migration that resulted in the colony’s near extinction in the early 
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1880s. Smallpox also accentuated the distance of the Icelanders, both literally 
and symbolically, from the wider settler community. In ways similar to those 
applied to Aboriginal people in later decades, the Icelanders’ poverty and sick-
ness were interpreted as functions of their racial and cultural inferiority, rather 
than their specific material circumstances. The 1876-1877 smallpox epidemic 
is an example of the linkages between discourses used to justify Aboriginal 
dispossession and marginalization, and those that sought to bring migrant popu-
lations into line with the norms and values of the dominant settler society. It is 
a reminder of the need to consider European migrants and Aboriginal people 
together as constituents of the same projects of colonial governance.
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